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wisdom or patriotism that saved their opponents. Jefferson was probably right in thinking that "if the war had continued a year longer it would have upset our government." The undeniable coldness of the Federalists towards the Union before and during the war was due in the main to the mismanagement of its affairs by the Republicans during the period from 1807 to the close of the war.

The chapter on "The English Liberals and the American Federalists," after quoting the censures of the Tory government by the Liberals because of its injustice to the United States, affirms that "the Federalists were much more ready to excuse England in her violation of our rights than were the English Liberals." There is truth in these assertions, but something that needs to be noted is left unsaid. Both the American Federalists and the English Liberals were parties in opposition; and each criticised the government, or the party in power, as is the wont of such parties. If in doing this the American opposition party went further than the English, it should be remembered that the American had more to complain of, and that in 1812 the restraining influence of national sentiment was less felt in the United States than in England-a fact which explains and excuses much in the conduct of Republicans as well as of Federalists. What was wholly virtuous when done by the English party in opposition does not become wholly vicious when done by its American counterpart.

In the following chapter, New England, at that time under the control of the Federalists, is made responsible for the refusal of Congress to follow "the lead of Madison and Gallatin in 1809"; for "if England and Napoleon had been given the alternative of ceasing their aggression or of going to war, there is great probability that the war would have been fought against France alone. In such a war the whole country would have been united." But the Congress that refused to follow the lead of Madison and Gallatin in 1809 was not under the control of New England or of the Federalist party. How then can they be held reponsible for its conduct?

But if I could establish my contention as to these and other points that seem to me in some degree questionable, it would not detract sensibly from the many and solid merits of this book. Professor Gordy has sought by unsparing effort to find the truth, and to tell it conscientiously. Each chapter is well wrought out and is instructive. The first volume was very good; this is better; and the reader will wait with impatience for those — more than two, I venture to hope—that are to follow.

ANSON D. MORSE.

The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859-1865. By John W. Burgess. [American History Series.] (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1901. Two Vols., pp. x, 320; vii, 347.)

PROFESSOR BURGESS has come so near writing the whole of this series that it does not strike one as an instance of the co-operative method in history work. His Civil War should be judged, I think, as any other

history of the war should be judged. True, his space was limited; and the title may, I suppose, be taken to indicate another limitation. he has found space enough, one fancies, to set forth with considerable fullness all the views which he himself felt to be important concerning disputed questions. He is not given to hints or adumbrations: on the contrary, he is always positive, and usually, notwithstanding his apparent indifference to style, he is also clear. The fact that this book is one of a series does not, therefore, prevent the reader from feeling that it is decidedly Professor Burgess's book throughout, and that it is a fairly complete presentation of the American Civil War as Professor Burgess sees it. That he sees it from the point of view of "political science," rather than the point of view of one human being concerned about the life of a great mass of human beings in a former period, would be apparent from a very cursory examination, even if he were not at pains to tel us so many times in the course of his narrative.

Beginning with a study of Davis, Lincoln, and Douglas, as the three principal figures, the three storm-centers of the agitation and debate which immediately preceded the disunion movement, he goes on, in his second chapter, to discuss the antislavery sentiment in the south, and makes, I think, his best contribution to an understanding of the situation there in his account of the rise of a bourgeoisie in the southern towns and cities, opposed politically and industrially to the dominance of the These two chapters are the most readable in the book. the principal events of the year 1860-1861 are then stated, dryly and straightforwardly, with comment and criticism which is always intelligent but never imaginative or sympathetic. A decidedly national view of the Union is maintained throughout, and little concession is made to the theories of the Southerners or the Copperheads. In later chapters, the campaigns and battles are related very much as if they were operations in the Kriegsspiel. We learn in each case the names of commanders. the numbers and the situation of the forces, the plans of battle, the actual movements, and the results. Meanwhile, though not much attention is given to war finance, the steps in emancipation are followed in the same way. There is a useful review of the governmental changes, all tending to centralism, which came about during the four years; and at the end there is an account of the international complications. more, for scientific purposes, could one require?

One reflects, however, that by far the greater number of persons who care to read two volumes on the Civil War will not have political science in mind. They will be interested, primarily, in a dramatic and profoundly moving story of human error, suffering, and heroism; and they will - very many of them - still have a notion that history is a department of literature. It would appear, therefore, that this work is meant chiefly for students of political science; and it is not to be doubted that these will find much of interest in Professor Burgess's discussions of various constitutional and political questions, and in his judgments of persons.

His opinion as to the true character of an American "state" is very close to Charles Sumner's. He even finds it necessary to use inverted commas in order to guard the reader against the error of supposing that the region across which Generals Curtis and Price led their armies was the "state" of Arkansas in any but a limited sense at the time of the Pea Ridge campaign. His treatment of the John Brown raid, following the analysis of Southern opinion on slavery, is the severest I have seen in any but pro-slavery books. His estimate of the effect it had in strengthening the disunion sentiment may be right; but many, even of those who agree with him on that point, will find his language rather violent. Brown, we are told, was "a notorious dead beat," had never succeeded in any legitimate business, had never earned any money, had two wives and some twenty children, and had left them to shift for themselves in penury and misery, while he was careering around performing things.... Brown had gotten into his first paying business, and he was determined not to have it ruined by publicity." His followers were "twenty-one villains," "Kansas desperadoes." Their performance was, naturally, "villainy": judged from the point of view of the responsibility of men for the means employed in the accomplishment of the plan of world civilization, it was "crime, and nothing but crime, common crime. and public crime." On the other hand, Professor Burgess, notwithstanding his entire rejection of Jefferson Davis's theories, evidently feels much admiration for the Confederate President, and even credits him, rather than Lee and Jackson, with the grand strategy of the Virginia campaign of 1862. This is quite different from the accounts of other writers - Mr. Rhodes's, for example, and Colonel Henderson's, in his Life of Jackson. One wishes here that the plan of the series had permitted an exhibition of authorities.

The book, I think, must depend chiefly on the discussions of constitutional points for its chance of a permanent place among the histories of the period. It will scarcely take rank as literature, and it has neither the fullness of detail nor the evidences of original research to justify one in considering it as a rival, say, to the work of Mr. Rhodes. For certain uses, however, its directness and matter-of-fact form may recommend it.

W. G. Brown.

Ancora un Po' più ai Luce sugli Eventi Politici e Militari dell' Anno 1866. Per Luigi Chiala. (Florence: G. Barbèra. 1902. Pp. viii, 675.)

This work of the illustrious Italian historian, Luigi Chiala, is the most important which has yet been published in any language upon the intricate diplomacy of Europe during the year 1866. In the general lines of the account Chiala does not depart notably from the most authoritative works of other Italian writers, but his account is far more detailed and complete than any of these, and not only does he reinforce the general statements of his predecessors with a wealth of documents and of